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Abstract1 
This study employs statistical methods to further develop the Macroeconomic Imbalance 
Procedure  (MIP) Scoreboard in line with the European Parliaments regulation of 2011, so 
as to make it an even better information aggregation, decision making and 
communication tool. The contribution to the literature and ongoing policy debate is 
threefold. First, we synthesize the current empirical literature and show that the 
predictive power of the MIP Scoreboard has so-far been limited. Second, we apply the 
methodology of composite indicators, step-by-step on the European Statistical Office 
(Eurostat) MIP Database (2005-11, 28 Member States, 11 MIP Indicators). By doing so, 
we spotted few outliers in the headline database, recommended normalised measures 
(red flag analysis, distance-to-target) already advocated by the European Commission, 
and conducted multivariate analysis revealing that MIP indicators are only weakly 
collinear and it is unlikely that they share common factors. Still, when applying the 
signals approach, which is a standard technique used by earlier empirical studies, a 
composite measure of threshold breaches was the available second best indicator to 
signal crisis events in advance. Third, we found that introducing two sided thresholds 
could be an obvious choice for some flow variables in the MIP scoreboard to identify 
imbalances both ex-ante and ex-post (in accordance with the prevention and correction 
goals of the MIP). Such two sided thresholds have been already introduced for two MIP 
indicators: for the current account deficit and for the real effective exchange rate. Real 
house prices, unemployment and private sector credit flow could be further candidates to 
consider for two sided thresholds. 
 
                                           
1 The authors gratefully acknowledge the help, comments and suggestions received from Daniel Vertesy (JRC), 
Lucia Alessi (JRC), Sven Langedijk (JRC), Claudia Ghisetti (JRC) during the discussion of the paper in the Joint 
Research Centre of the Commission at the COIN Seminar, Ispra, 12 June 2017, from Jean-Charles Bricongne 
(DG ECFIN, EC), Jonas Fischer (DG ECFIN, EC), at internal discussions, in July 2018, and from Carsten Detken 
(ESRB), Sandor Gardo (ECB), Heleen Hofmans (Bank of England), Piotr Kusmierczyk (ESRB), Rob Nijskens (de 
Nederlandsche Bank), Tuomas Peltonen (ESRB), at the meeting of the European Systemic Risk Board Analysis 
Working Group in Lisbon, 2 July 2018.  
 
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official views of 
the European Commission.  
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1 MIP – RATIONALE AND IMPLEMENTATION 
“The good ended happily,  
and the bad unhappily.” 
THE IMPORTANCE OF  
BEING EARNEST 
Oscar Wilde 
The European Commission introduced the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) in 
2011 as part of the “Six-Pack” legislation, so as to react to the Global Financial Crisis and 
to correct and prevent macroeconomic imbalances in the European Union (EU).  
The rationale for supra-national surveillance in the EU builds on the possible spill-over 
effects of macroeconomic imbalances within the EU, which could compromise the proper 
functioning of the monetary union, its functioning and institutions (European 
Commission, 2016). The close interconnectedness of EU economies means that 
imbalances or other unfavourable developments in a given country may significantly 
impact other Member States. The Regulation (No 1176/2011) defines  
 
‘imbalances’ as any trend giving rise to macroeconomic developments which are 
adversely affecting, or have the potential adversely to affect, the proper 
functioning of the economy of a Member State or of the economic and monetary 
union, or of the Union as a whole;  
 
‘excessive imbalances’ means severe imbalances, including imbalances that 
jeopardise or risk jeopardising the proper functioning of the economic and 
monetary union.  
At the global level, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) oversees the international 
monetary system, highlights possible risks to stability and advises on needed policy 
adjustments. In this way, it helps the international monetary system serve its essential 
purpose of sustaining economic growth by facilitating the exchange of goods, services, 
and capital among countries, and ensuring the conditions necessary for financial and 
economic stability. Another prominent example for continental surveillance cooperation is 
the Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO), which is the regional macroeconomic 
surveillance unit of the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation (CMIM) members2 since 
2009.  
The MIP is integrated into the annual cycle of the EU’s economic monitoring, the 
European Semester. The annual MIP procedure has four steps starting with the screening 
of countries on the basis of  
 MIP Scoreboard, 
 Alert Mechanism Report (AMR),  
 In-Depth Review (IDR), and  
 MIP Categorisation. 
Figure 1. Flow chart of the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure 
 
                                           
2 CMIM Members: China and Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia, Myanmar, Brunei Darussalam, Laos. 
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The quantitative information in Step 1, the so-called MIP Scoreboard (Box 1.) is 
complemented by additional quantitative and qualitative information contained in the 
Alert Mechanism Report (AMR) in order to identify the first list of member states with 
macroeconomic imbalances (European Commission, 2016), and finally by the In-Depth 
Reviews to select Member States with macroeconomic imbalances. The economic reading 
of the MIP scoreboard indicators is further complemented by auxiliary indicators for 
which no threshold has been calculated.  
Box 1. MIP Scoreboard  
Principles of the MIP scoreboard 
(i) Summarize the most relevant dimensions of macroeconomic imbalances 
(ii) Serve as a reliable signalling device 
(iii) Support effective communication by using simple and straightforward measures 
(iv) Ensure high statistical quality 
11+3 Headline indicators and thresholds 
The MIP Scoreboard is a set of headline indicators aiming at the assessment of 
macroeconomic risks (European Commission, 2012). It consists of 14 indicators 
currently. Initially, the MIP Scoreboard was built upon 11 indicators, which were 
augmented by additional 3 employment indicators (European Commission, 2015). 
However, these new headline indicators do not play a direct role in the identification of 
macro-financial risks and do not trigger by themselves steps in the MIP, hence this report 
does not cover them.  
The headline indicators consist of (I) five external imbalance indicators, and (II) six 
internal imbalance indicators and (III) employment indicators. (Indicative upper and/or 
lower thresholds for the 14 headline indicators are in parenthesis below):  
I. EXTERNAL IMBALANCE INDICATORS 
Current account balance: in % of GDP, 3 years average (+6% and - 4%) 
Net international investment position: in % of GDP (-35%) 
Real effective exchange rate: 42 trade partners, 3 years % change   
(-/+5% for euro-area countries and - /+11% for non-euro-area countries) 
Export market shares: 5 years % change (- 6%) 
Nominal unit labour cost index: 3 years % change  
(+9% for euro-area countries and +12% for non-euro-area countries) 
II. INTERNAL IMBALANCE INDICATORS 
House price index, deflated: 1 year % change (6%) 
Private sector credit flow: consolidated, in % of GDP (15%) 
Private sector debt: consolidated, in % of GDP (133%) 
General government sector debt: in % of GDP (60%) 
Unemployment rate: 3 years average (10%) 
Total financial sector liabilities: non-consolidated - 1 year % change (16.5%) 
III. UNEMPLOYMENT INDICATORS (Unemployment indicators do not trigger 
steps in the MIP procedure.) 
Activity rate (15-64 years): 3 year % point change (0.2%) 
Long-term unemployment rate: 3 year % of active population in the same age 
group, % point change (0.5%) 
Young people neither in employment nor in education and training: in % of total 
population, 3 year % point change (2%) 
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2 PRACTICAL CHALLENGES OF THE MIP 
The general consensus about economic policy in the academia and amongst practitioners 
is that forward looking approaches can yield better economic results then adaptive ones. 
Although improved macroeconomic monitoring efforts have been always welcomed 
worldwide in the aftermath of the financial crisis situations, their implementation has still 
been subject to discussion. There are no ready-made and perfect solutions of macro 
surveillance systems yet. For example, targets of the surveillance and macroeconomic 
circumstances may influence the design of scoreboards and other types of information 
aggregation tools used. A critical question discussed in the next section is, for the MIP as 
well, whether it serves as an early warning or as a monitoring system or both.  
 
2.1 Combining discretion and policy rules 
The MIP combines (i) policy rules with (ii) discretion in decision making (Figure 1). The 
advantage of the former is its clarity, consistency, while its disadvantage is the lack of 
flexibility and discretion. Mellers et al. (1998) argued that application of rules or norms 
often minimizes effort and provides satisfying solutions that are “good enough,” though 
not necessarily the best. On the other hand, when rules are ambiguous, people look for 
reasons to guide their decisions. Advantages of transparency, numerical targets and 
evaluation in central banking has been proved by empirical papers (Naszódi et al., 2016). 
Furthermore, numerical fiscal rules have been introduced by EU Member States. The 
Maastricht Criteria could be also considered (a) as a set of indicators and thresholds that 
have been used to evaluate ex-ante whether the macroeconomic situation of Member 
States is ready for the adoption of the single currency and (b) as a tool to monitor macro 
financial imbalances before Eurozone membership. 
The MIP Scoreboard with its numerical thresholds is an example of explicit policy rules, 
while the Alert Mechanism Report and In-depth Reviews form a basis of discretion. 
According to the REGULATION (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and the 
Council the MIP  
“should be based on the use of an indicative and transparent ‘scoreboard’ 
comprising indicative thresholds, combined with economic judgement.”  
However, the MIP Scoreboard indicators are neither policy targets nor policy instruments 
and comments from the European Parliament, ECOFIN, ESRB, EPC, ECB are taken into 
account. 
Such discretion or judgement, however, could imply that the European Commission’s 
‘true model’ of behaviour is uncertain as highlighted by Boysen-Hogrefe et al. (2015). 
Ironically, however, the MIP Scoreboard, which is clearly the most transparent and rule 
based element of the EU macroeconomic surveillance, has been often the key target of 
criticism since it was introduced.  
 
2.1 Is the MIP an Early Warning System or a Penalty Bench? 
The REGULATION (EU) No 1176/2011 sets out detailed rules for the detection of 
macroeconomic imbalances, with the double objectives of  
(1) to prevent imbalances as an early warnings system (EWS) and  
(2) to correct persisting imbalances (a ‘penalty bench’).  
In other words, the MIP Scoreboard aims at identifying imbalances ex-ante during the 
run-up to crisis situations (so as to trigger pre-emptive actions) and also at monitoring 
imbalances ex-post (so as to trigger corrective actions). Flow variables may be better 
serve as Early Warning System, while stock variables are better for the ex-post 
monitoring of fading away imbalances. This duality of goals also mirrored by the 
Regulation (No 1176/2011) 
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‘The scoreboard comprising the set of indicators, shall be used as a tool to 
facilitate early identification and monitoring of imbalances.’ 
The duality of goals, however, may introduce some inconsistency, as the same indicators 
could be read differently if the goal is the early detection of imbalances or if the goal is 
ex-post monitoring. For example, in case of real house prices, the official MIP threshold 
of +6% could be interpreted as part of the early warning system. On the other hand, no 
lower threshold exists for house price declines, which could signal a bust period and 
serve monitoring purposes (read more on two sided thresholds in Section 2.2.2). Such 
cyclicality is a phenomenon of several indicators and in general of the macroeconomy, 
see in Table 7. As a result, symmetric threshold could be considered to filter out both 
boom period imbalances and bust period imbalances.  
2.2.1 Early Warning Capacity of the MIP headline indicators 
Early warning could be equated with an alarm bell that rings well before disaster strikes 
to allow response. Numerous empirical studies on the MIP applied the so-called signals 
approach (Boysen-Hogrefe et a.l, 2015; Knedlik, 2014 and Csortos-Szalai, 2013). The 
idea of the signals approach is that an indicator or a system of indicators can forecast a 
financial crisis, whenever it exceeds or falls below a certain threshold in a given forecast 
horizon (Box 2). Such identification of the best performing early warning indicators could 
be advantageous, because it could help design an optimal scoreboard or composite 
measure.  
Empirical works have concluded so far that the predictive power of the MIP Scoreboard 
Indicators is low (Boysen-Hogrefe et al., 2015; Knedlik, 2014 and Csortos-Szalai, 2013). 
Furthermore, the difficulty of early warning in case of macroeconomic surveillance is 
confirmed by the fact that different studies identified different indicators useful as alarm 
bells (Table 1). Csortos-Szalai (2013) showed that only in the cases of the current 
account deficit and the unemployment rate were the prediction ratios better than the 
ratios of false alarms to alarms total. Boysen-Hogrefe et al. (2015) found that house 
prices, private sector debt, and private sector credit flow are the best early warning 
indicators of crisis events. Furthermore, export market shares, private sector credit flow 
and private debt were best predictors of MIP classification. Knedlik (2014) showed that 
the usefulness is the highest for the current account, net international investment 
position and nominal unit labour costs. Domonkos et al (2017) found that in the short 
run private sector debt is the best performing indicator amongst the headline indicators, 
complemented by current account balances in the long term. 
Table 1. Best indicators to signal crisis events and MIP classification 
 
A possible explanation for the differences in the results could be that the 
target/dependent variables were derived from different concepts. Csortos-Szalai (2013) 
similar to our analysis (see in Section 3.8) used the cyclical GDP, Boysen-Hogrefe et al. 
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(2015) analysed financial crisis events (including systemic, banking, sovereign debt and 
currency crisis events) and the IdR classification and Knedlik (2014) the debt crisis 
events.  
Knedlik (2014) also remarked that some indicators perform differently as early warning 
indicators in different countries. For instance, ULC performs excellently in Central and 
Eastern European countries but poorly in the Eurozone. Public sector debt is a very 
important indicator for the Eurozone but not for the rest of the European Union; the 
unemployment rate and export market share are relevant early warning indicators in the 
Eurozone but not in Central and Eastern European countries. 
The European Commission (2016) compendium gave empirical evidence that stock 
variables were the ones displaying a significant impact on MIP categorisation so far. A 
possible interpretation is that, the MIP categorization was rather based on the correction 
of the latest crisis and on the slow correction of stock variables, rather than on the 
prevention of the next crisis and quicker improvements in flow variables in a number of 
countries. The MIP procedure has been regressed on Country-Specific Recommendations 
(CSR) progress indicator and also synthetic indicator of economic conditions, in flows and 
in levels (pp81), showing the influence of the latter.  
Another difficulty in using MIP as early warning signal is potential endogeneity, since the 
European Commission plays both the role of the economist and of the institutional actor 
who can influence evolutions. Hence, paradoxically, to take a polar case, if the European 
Commission identifies an imbalance with an associated flash in the scoreboard, issues a 
recommendation that is followed by a country, and implemented with full progress, 
hence the signal will appear as "false alarm" since no crisis appears whereas the 
procedure, in this case, is 100% efficient on its preventive side. 
Finally, different explanations could be given as to why establishing effective early 
warning systems is a difficult analytical and policy challenge. First, vulnerabilities are 
time and place dependent. Second, early warning indicators may fail to trigger action in 
due time (and in many cases they did fail in practice in the past), because policy makers 
were resistant to act on vague warnings in good times. The MIP is definitely subject to 
these challenges.  
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Box 2. Signals Approach  
Basic methodology 
The signals approach uses indicators and thresholds for forecasting crisis events, 
therefore can be easily applied on the MIP Scoreboard (see the empirical analysis of MIP 
signals in Section 33.8). An indicator signals a crisis, if it exceeds or falls below a certain 
threshold. Overall, there are four cases (A, B, C, D) depending on whether a crisis signal 
or the absence of a crisis signal was correct or incorrect. 
A equals the number years, in which the indicator CORRECTLY provides signal. 
B equals the number of years, in which the indicator INCORRECTLY provides signal. 
C equals the number of years, in which the indicator INCORRECTLY provides NO 
signal. 
D equals the number of years, in which the indicator CORRECTLY provides NO signal. 
 
Signal performance evaluation 
The less binding the thresholds, the more crises are correctly predicted (A) but at the 
same time the number of incorrect signals (B) and, thus, the number of ‘false alarms’, 
eg. type II errors increases. In the same vein, a higher threshold increases the number 
of cases, in which one correctly predicts that no crisis occurs (D) but it also increases the 
number of crises without any preceding signal (C) and, thus the number of type I errors. 
The Commission aimed at striking a healthy balance when setting MIP thresholds at 
prudent levels, in order to avoid both excessive numbers of 'false alarms', and on the 
other hand also unacceptable delays of signals. (European Commission, 2012). 
Correct crisis signals 
𝐴
𝐴+𝐶
 
Type I error 
𝐶
𝐴+𝐶
, the share of crisis events, when the early warning system 
failed to give signal. 
Type II error =
𝐵
𝐵+𝐷
, share of events, when the early warning system incorrectly 
signalled crisis ('false alarms').  
Noise-to-Signal Ratio: =
𝐵
𝐵+𝐷
𝐴
𝐴+𝐶
 , is calculated as the share of incorrectly signalled 
crises in number of years.  
Usefulness: 𝑼 = min[𝜃; 1 − 𝜃] − 𝐿= min[𝜃; 1 − 𝜃] − 𝜃
𝐶
𝐴+𝐶
− (1 − 𝜃)
𝐵
𝐵+𝐷
 
Empirical evaluations of early warning indicators are frequently based on a usefulness 
function U that in turn is based on a loss function L. In the loss function certain weights 
θ and (1 − θ) are explicitly assigned to the share of type I errors (C/(A + C)) and type II 
errors (B/(B + D)). 
An early warning indicator is the more useful, the lower the NSR and the higher the 
value of U is and is generally considered useful if U > 0. 
Source: authors, Boysen-Hogrefe et al., 2015 
YES NO
YES A B
NO C D
Si
gn
al
Crisis
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2.2.2 Setting (two sided) thresholds 
The European Commission (2012) derived MIP thresholds for many indicators from the 
distribution of indicators observed in the past and equated the thresholds to lower and 
/or upper quartiles. Most indicators have only one threshold, and an argumentation in 
favour of the necessity of two sided thresholds could also be based on the distribution of 
indicators for flow variables in the MIP scoreboard, which is in most cases symmetric (not 
skewed). (See the distribution of MIP indicators in Figure 3, and the 1st and 3rd quartiles 
in Annex 2.) 
Several empirical works used the signalling approach to establish optimal thresholds by 
changing the standard assumption about the preferences of policy makers with regard to 
the trade-off between correct signals for crisis periods and wrong signals for non-crisis 
periods (Boysen-Hogrefe et al., 2015; Knedlik, 2014 and Csortos-Szalai, 2013). Knedlik 
(2014) also concluded that the thresholds of the Commission's Scoreboard are rather 
tight (resulting in more alarm signals), as compared to a neutral stand, and the 
usefulness of official thresholds is negative for all indicators. All these could have political 
economy consequences.  
In this report, we argue that the lack of two sided thresholds in case of some indicators 
may raise doubt about whether the thresholds are consistent and optimal. For example, 
in case of house prices the +6% current official one sided threshold could be interpreted 
as an early warning threshold, while the 10% current official threshold for unemployment 
as an ex-post indicator of fading away crisis and imbalances. Also, in case of export 
market shares the minus 6% threshold can help to identify loss of competiveness and 
imbalances ex-post.  
Two sided thresholds could be an obvious choice for many indicators to identify 
imbalances both ex-ante and ex-post. For example, unemployment rates below the so-
called natural rate may be a sign of a boom period and serve as an early-warning 
indicator. Table 7 shows that average unemployment rate in Member States dropped 
below 7 percent, which may be close to the natural level (See the 1st quartile of the 
distribution in Annex 2, which equals 6.4 percent). A drop in the real house price index or 
limited credit flows to the private sector could be an indicator of adjustments. Such two 
sided thresholds has been already introduced for two variables: the current account 
deficit and for the real effective exchange rate.  
Boysen-Hogrefe et al. (2015) argued that the MIP was introduced after the final crises of 
the years 2008 and 2009, hence, it was mainly concerned with addressing 
macroeconomic consequences of these crises ex-post. All in all, establishing two sided 
thresholds for other indicators could be worth considering to enable the MIP Scoreboard 
to serve its double goals (prevention and correction of imbalances). 
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3 APPLYING THE OECD-JRC METHODOLOGY 
Composite indicators (Cis) can help summarize multifaceted information for such 
complex and versatile concepts as macroeconomic imbalances. They compare country 
performance and recognised as a practical tool for analysis and communication (OECD-
JRC, 2008). Furthermore, the reduction of dimensions can result in more straightforward 
communication based on CIs in accordance with the principles of the MIP (Box 1). 
Opponents, however often draw attention to the drawbacks of ill-designed composite 
indicators, which could generate misbeliefs that policy issues are simple and can be 
automatized. 
Csortos-Szalai (2013) concluded that if the MIP Scoreboard indicators are examined 
together, i.e. in certain combinations, the results are much better than the ones shown 
by individual indicators.  
Christensen and Li (2014) argued that one straightforward way of capturing the fragility 
of the economy prior to a financial stress event is to keep track of the number of signals 
being issued in the different sectors of the economy. The information provided by all the 
indicators can be then combined to assess the likelihood of an upcoming financial stress 
event. They considered three composite indicators based on normal and extreme 
thresholds.  
Finally, this step-by-step procedure could be an alternative way to understand 
macroeconomic imbalances, and see what are differences/similarities between the 
conclusions based on In-depth Reviews and based on simply the scoreboard (See Figure 
1). In other words, different ways of aggregation of the scoreboard signals can also 
support crosschecking the conclusions based on the AMR and IdR.  
3.1 Data 
The analysis in this report was based on the MIP dataset of European Statistical Office 
(Eurostat) for the 28 EU Member States and 11 MIP headline indicator that were 
considered for the AMR (Box 3). There are 308 observations for each indicators for the 
period between 2005 and 2015 (except for real house prices for which we had 305 
observations) summing to 3385 observations (11 Indicators X 28 Member States X 11 
years – 3 missing values). 
The great advantage of the dataset is that it combines observations form the pre- and 
post-crisis (boom and bust) periods. Hence, the database and the statistical analysis is 
less subject to possible biases of economic cyclicality. Annex 2 provides summary 
statistics (mean, skewness, quartiles etc.) table for the MIP Scoreboard indicators.  
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Box 3. Data details and sources  
 
KEY DATA CARACHTERISTICS 
Time: yearly data 2005-2015, 11 years 
Cross section: EU member states  
Source of data: EUROSTAT 
2017 MIP dataset (data for 2006-2015) 
2016 MIP dataset (data for 2005) 
 
TREATMENT OF MISSING VALUES 
19 missing values have been replaced by the values of the latest MIP dataset in 
which the data could be found.  
- Denmark, Current account balance -  (2006)   source: 2015 MIP  
- Denmark, Export market shares   (2006, 2007, 2008, 2009) source: 2016 MIP  
- Greece, General gov. debt   (2005)    source: 2014 MIP  
- Hungary, House price index, deflated  (2006, 2007)    source: 2013 MIP  
- Malta, Export market shares   (2006, 2007)   source: 2016 MIP  
- Poland, House price index, deflated  (2006, 2007, 2008)   source: 2013 MIP  
- Romania, House price index, deflated  (2006, 2007, 2008)   source: 2013 MIP  
- Slovakia, House price index, deflated  (2006)    source: 2013 MIP  
- Slovakia, Export market shares   (2006, 2007, 2008)  source: 2016 MIP  
 
1 missing value has been replaced by a value from an external data source 
- Hungary , House price index, deflated  (2005)    source: FHB bank 
 
Missing values (not estimated) 
- Poland, House price index, deflated  (2005)    MISSING 
- Romania, House price index, deflated  (2005)    MISSING 
- Slovakia,  House price index, deflated  (2005)    MISSING 
3.2 Next steps in building composite indicators 
The overarching objective of building composite indicators is not the end result of a 
streamlined composite indicator. More importantly, the composite indicator methodology 
is a rigorous step-by-step procedure to structure discussion about indicators, about their 
relationship with each other and with the underlying concept.  
Each step of the composite indicators methodology can deliver important results and 
contribute to the development of the MIP Scoreboard as a monitoring, decision making 
and communication tool in line with the MIP’s principles (Table 1Table 2). The first two 
steps have been already taken, as there exist a theoretical framework (see the detailed 
literature review in European Commission, 2012), a carefully selected set of indicators 
and high quality official data (Eurostat database). In the following, we discuss further 
steps: treatment of missing data and outliers, multivariate analysis, normalisation, 
weighting and aggregation, uncertainty analysis and visualisation. 
12 
 
Table 2. Key steps of building composite indicators and results for MIP Scoreboard 
Steps Checklist Section in this 
report 
Theoretical framework    
Data selection    
Missing data and outliers   3.3 
Multivariate analysis (grouping of indicators)   3.4 
Normalisation   3.5 
Weighting and aggregation   3.6 
Uncertainty analysis   Error! Reference 
ource not found. 
Visualisation   3.10 
Source: OECD-JRC (2008) 
3.3 Treatment of missing and outlier data 
Box 2 reports on the missing values that have been replaced by values published in 
earlier MIP datasets. There remain 3 missing values on real house price index for Poland, 
Romania and Slovak Republic in 2005. Because house prices were very volatile in Central 
and Eastern European countries due to the economic transformation during the previous 
decades, and other data sources (statistical offices, central banks, BIS database) also did 
not offer an alternative source, these three values have not been replaced. The number 
of missing values was almost negligible (3/3385 <0.1%), hence our choice is not likely to 
affect the results of the statistical analysis.  
Outliers can introduce spurious variability in the data and undesired biases into decision 
making. To identify outliers in the database, we used simple rules of thumb 
recommended in the empirical literature (Saisana – Torreiro – Vertesy, 2016) and applied 
a combined threshold for skewness and kurtosis (absolute value of skewness > 2 and 
kurtosis >3.5). Three indicators were identified with this method: (i) nominal unit labour 
cost, (ii) private sector credit flow and (iii) total financial liabilities (Figure 2).  
We opted for a straightforward and well-known method to treat outliers, called 
Winzorization, and used the next observed value in our database for the indicator. Four 
values have been subject to winzorisation (Cyprus-2008-Total financial sector liabilities, 
Latvia-2007-2008-Nominal unit labour costs, Luxembourg-2007-Private sector credit 
flow). 
3.4 Multivariate analysis 
3.4.1 Consistency and adequacy tests 
The Cronbach–alpha (C-alpha) is regarded as a metric of internal consistency and 
reliability for indicators aiming at describing a complex phenomenon. It measures the 
portion of total sample variance due to the correlation of individual indicators. If no 
correlation exists and individual indicators are independent, then C-alpha is equal to 
zero, while if individual indicators are perfectly correlated, C-alpha is equal to one.  
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The reliability of MIP Scoreboard, measured by the Cronbach-alpha value, is relatively 
low at 0.39 for the external imbalance pillar of MIP scoreboard indicators and 0.15 for the 
internal imbalance pillar, both well below the 0.7 threshold for a reliable aggregate.  
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure is another measure of adequacy, which takes 
values between 0 and 1, and principal component analysis is not recommended if the 
measure is below 0.5. The KMO total for the MIP dataset is 0.67 which is above the 
minimum threshold, although classified as ’mediocre’, not very good.  
3.4.2 Correlation analysis 
Correlation analysis can show whether there are highly or weakly related to indicators, or 
if some correlations do not have the expected sign. The absolute values of pairwise 
correlations are out of the standard thresholds (0.4 and 0.9) recommended for 
composites in most cases within external and internal dimensions of the MIP Scoreboard. 
This confirms the conclusions based on the Cronbach-alpha that consistency of MIP 
indicators is limited. Because the correlation between indicators is weak, it is unlikely 
that they share common factors. This confirms the conclusions based on the Cronbach-
alpha that consistency of MIP indicators is limited. 
As the variance of stock variables is low, some of them show only weak correlation with 
other indicators. For example, the net international investment position correlates well 
only with current account as the current account is a key driver of NIIP, and with 
unemployment. Similarly, private sector debt correlates well only with export market 
shares.  
Table 3. Pearson correlation coefficients of MIP Scoreboard indicators 
 
*Correlation coefficients are calculated for the entire sample. Coefficients are highlighted 
in orange cell colour, if the absolute value was in the recommended range [0.3;0.9].  
 
The correlation coefficient is also dependent on whether the entire sample or only 
selected years have been used for the calculation. The dispersion of correlation 
coefficients estimated for annual subsamples was about 20-30 percentage points for 
most indicator pairs.  
The direction of indicators influences the sign of calculated correlation coefficients. In 
case of several MIP Indicators there is no preferred direction, because both too high and 
too low values could be problematic, except perhaps some stock variables (general 
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government debt, private sector debt). This is the reason why lower and upper 
thresholds are introduced in case of current account deficit and real exchange rate 
evolution. Again, this leads back to the discussion in Section 2 about the duality of goals 
(prevention and correction) and to the need for two sided thresholds.  
To investigate, whether the different MIP indicators signal problems in the same time the 
association of the official MIP threshold breaches were analyzed. We used the Phi 
coefficient to measure association of threshold breaches, because it better suits the 
analysis in our case with binary variables than the Spearman, Pearson or the Kendall tau 
correlation measures (MIP threshold breaches are coded into 0 and 1 values in our 
analysis). The Phi coefficient is similar to the correlation coefficient in its interpretation.  
The Phi coefficient matrix (Table 4) reveals that the association within dimensions and 
even within the entire set of scoreboard indicators became positive. This suggests that 
the MIP scoreboard indicators and thresholds are consistent. Still, Phi coefficients are 
very low, although significant in most cases. A practical consequence of moderated 
association is that if the scoreboard gave usually vague warning signals, e.g. only few 
but not necessary all or not the majority of indicators gave signals at the same time, 
then policy makers were more likely to become resistant to act.  
Table 4. Phi coefficient matrix of red flags 
 
*Phi- coefficients are highlighted in orange cell colour, if the absolute value was in the recommended range 
[0.3;0.9].  
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3.5 Normalisation 
The practical use of the MIP Scoreboard might be impeded by the different measurement 
units of headline indicators. In this report, common normalisation methods are applied 
together with methods based on the guidance provided by DG ECFIN of the European 
Commission about the interpretation of the scoreboard3: 
 Min-max normalisation: comparison of actual values to the observed range of the 
indicator. 
𝑥𝑖𝑗−𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑥𝑖)
𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑥𝑖𝑗)−min⁡(𝑥𝑖𝑗)
, where xij is the value of the indicator i in country j 
across all years (Section 3.5.1 of the report). 
 Red flag analysis based on thresholds: a comparison of actual values to the official 
thresholds results in a simple statistics how frequently the alarm bell rings for 
indicators and countries, which converts indicator values into a binary indicator 
(the transformed indicator takes up the value of 1 if the headline indicator is 
above the threshold, and 0 otherwise, see Section 3.5.1.of the report) 
 Distance to target: is a ratio of the absolute difference between the actual value 
and threshold in percent of the threshold to measure “the severity of a breach of a 
threshold” (Section 3.5.3 of the report); 
 Dynamic analysis : the scoreboard should be “read also over time” :not only the 
scoreboard values for the last year are important (Section3.5.4 of the report) 
 Ranking: converting headline figures into rankings to compare relative 
performance of countries (Section Error! Reference source not found.. of the report) 
3.5.1 Min-max normalisation 
The commonly used method for normalisation is the so-called min-max normalisation 
that converts variables into a 0-1 scale. Figure 2. compares values of indicator thresholds 
to sample means and to the standard deviation of indicators (all normalized). Mean of 
those indicators that rang alarm bells most frequently are close to thresholds.  
Figure 2. Normalized values of headline and winzorized MIP Scoreboard indicators* 
Headline indicator distributions Winsorised indicator distributions 
  
*Normalized with min-max normalization. Abbreviations:.ca = Current Account Deficit, niip = Net International 
Investment Position, reer = Real Effective Exchange Rate, expsh = Export Market Share, ulc = Nominal 
Unit Labour Cost, rhouseprice = Real House Price, privcrflow = Private Sector Credit Flow, privdebt = 
Private Sector Debt, govdebt = General Government Sector Debt, unemp = Unemployment Rate, 
totfinancin = Total Financial Sector Liabilities.  
Source: Eurostat, 2016 
                                           
3 European Commission, 2016: The MIP indicator scoreboard, 14th Annual meeting of Community of Practice on 
Composite Indicators and Scoreboards:, Joint Research Centre of the European Commission, Ispra, 26-28 
September 2016 https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/sites/jrcsh/files/20160929-cop-macroeconomicimbalancesprocefureindicatorscoreboard.pdf  
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3.5.2 Thresholds and MIP Scoreboard red flags 
The official MIP thresholds serve as benchmarks to group indicator values into acceptable 
and unacceptable ranges. Table 5 shows the number of red flags** by year and by MIP 
indicators. Similar kind of red flag analysis based on the MIP Scoreboard headline 
indicators and thresholds were incorporated in the Commission analysis, without being 
the only or main determinant of the AMR outcomes (European Commission, 2016). 
The use of the scoreboard is not limited to the number of red flags (or flashes). Figures 
by themselves, combined with other indicators, in the scoreboard or not, may be used to 
identify imbalances. Combination of indicators is not the only way to go further in the use 
or refinement of the scoreboard. Other treatments such as the splitting (private debt into 
households and non-financial corporations debt for example) may be a way to identify 
imbalances. Of course, the European Commission has to strike a healthy balance 
between the principles of the MIP scoreboard, namely between the statistical quality, 
timeliness and communication role.  
Table 5. Number of MIP scoreboard red flags* by indicator and by year** 
 
*Grey cell colour marks indicators that signalled imbalance most frequently in our sample.  
** Number of red flags equals the number of countries per indicator which were sorted into the unacceptable 
range, i.e. exceeding upper thresholds or falling below lower ones. 
Source: Eurostat, 2016, authors calculations 
 
Current account balance, net international investment position, export market shares, 
private and general government debt were the key factors that came up as red flags 
most frequently in the MIP Scoreboard. On average 15 Member States were flagged 
every year for the net international investment position, and approximately 11-13 for 
current account balance, export market shares, private sector debt and general 
government debt. It is not surprising that many of these variables are stock variables, 
because the adjustment of these is more difficult. On the other hand strong private 
sector credit flow, fast growing house prices was problematic in few Member States and 
only before the crisis.  
The number of red flags decreased over time gradually between 2005 and 2015 as the 
economic situation consolidated in the aftermath of the crisis. On average 11 Member 
States were flagged for each indicator in the period between 2005-2009, and only 8 in 
2015.  
The European Commission (2012) established MIP thresholds for many indicators from 
the observed distribution of indicators and equated the thresholds to lower/upper 
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2005 16 12 9 4 9 15 8 9 10 9 19 10.9
2006 17 12 4 9 7 19 11 10 9 5 12 10.5
2007 18 14 4 8 9 15 17 11 9 3 14 11.1
2008 18 16 9 11 11 4 11 12 9 2 4 9.7
2009 17 16 10 11 23 0 0 14 11 3 1 9.6
2010 13 16 4 16 11 1 0 14 12 8 0 8.6
2011 8 16 3 16 5 0 3 13 15 10 1 8.2
2012 9 16 10 20 1 0 2 13 15 11 0 8.8
2013 5 16 0 19 3 2 0 13 16 14 0 8.0
2014 5 16 1 18 3 5 1 13 17 12 2 8.5
2015 5 15 5 11 4 6 1 13 17 12 0 8.1
AVERAGE (2005-2015) 12 15 5 13 8 6 5 12 13 8 5
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quartiles. The argumentation of this practice (introduction of both upper and lower 
thresholds) could be based on theoretical arguments (see Section 2.2.2) supported by a 
statistical approach that values in both tails of the distribution could be differentiated. 
Histograms of most indicators are not skewed to either side, therefore a preferred 
“normal” range could be identified and the pair of the current one sided thresholds could 
be set as the first or third quartile on the other side of the distribution. Such symmetric 
thresholds have been introduced for the current accounts and for real effective exchange 
rates, and this approach could be applied to some of the flow variables in the MIP 
Scoreboard.  
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Figure 3. Histograms and thresholds of some MIP indicators* (%) 
EXTERNAL IMBALANCE INDICATORS INTERNAL IMBALANCE 
INDICATORS 
CA 
 
NIIP       
 
Real House Prices 
 
Private sector debt
 
 Private sector credit flow
 
REER (EA)
 
REER (non EA) 
 
General government debt
 
Export market shares
 
 Unemployment rate
 
Nominal Unit Labour Cost (EA) 
 
Nom. Unit Lab. Cost (non EA) 
 
Total financial sector liabilities 
 
* Measures in % according to MIP definition in Box 1 
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3.5.3 Distance to thresholds 
An alternative way to measure the severity of imbalances can be based on the absolute 
distance between actual values and MIP headline indicator thresholds in percent of the 
threshold. Such a metric could signal not only the breach of the threshold but also the 
magnitude of deviation, which is a relevant factor taken into account in the MIP 
categorisation by DG ECFIN. 
The last column in Table 6, which averages the absolute distance to thresholds does not 
seem to mirror the run up to the 2008-2009 crisis, rather it can be used to evaluate the 
situation ex-post.   
Deviation from thresholds for flow variables exhibited a clear adjustment path in the 
aftermath of the crisis, suggesting that the MIP thresholds, which are although not policy 
targets, could have supported adjustments in Member States and anchoring short term 
macroeconomic outcomes. Stock variables (NIIP, debt variables) remained above or 
below threshold and the correction has only started recently.  
Table 6. Absolute distance to thresholds (in % of the MIP official threshold, average 
country values)* 
       
Source: Eurostat, 2016, authors calculations 
*Grey cell colour marks indicators that signalled imbalance most frequently 
As regards distance to thresholds metric, again one should be cautious. Indeed, it is a 
factor that should be considered, but some economic factors may justify a high distance 
to threshold, without any potential imbalance. For example, if consolidated private debt 
does not consolidate international intra-group debt, it may explain why debt of non 
financial companies and (and thus also private debt) remains high for countries such as 
Ireland, Belgium or Luxembourg for example. 
3.5.4 Dynamic analysis 
The current MIP practice requires that the scoreboard should be read also over time, and 
not only for the last year available. Some indicators existing on a quarterly basis could be 
used when available, for example, to signal as soon as possible potential adjustments or 
need for adjustment. 
Headline figures show how the indicators behaved before and after the financial crisis, 
i.e. during the run-up period leading to crisis and during the correction. After the 
mid2000s dynamic private credit flow, expanding financial sector liabilities, increase in 
private and government debt levels, current account deficit accumulation, growing house 
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2005 34% 29% 19% 11% 22% 64% 20% 13% 10% 9% 57% 55%
2006 52% 36% 8% 33% 21% 141% 30% 15% 9% 6% 35% 73%
2007 67% 44% 13% 30% 42% 115% 77% 22% 8% 3% 35% 55%
2008 83% 55% 18% 54% 59% 13% 13% 25% 10% 1% 31% 18%
2009 60% 71% 29% 39% 58% 0% 0% 29% 16% 1% 0% 41%
2010 29% 76% 8% 66% 21% 0% 0% 26% 21% 7% 0% 93%
2011 14% 75% 3% 70% 3% 0% 10% 27% 27% 15% 3% 223%
2012 11% 77% 17% 151% 0% 0% 4% 29% 31% 19% 0% 104%
2013 5% 76% 0% 111% 1% 1% 0% 26% 36% 21% 0% 66%
2014 6% 78% 0% 94% 5% 11% 1% 27% 37% 23% 4% 21%
2015 6% 72% 3% 39% 7% 9% 2% 27% 35% 20% 0% 0%AVERAGE       
(2005- 33% 63% 11% 63% 22% 32% 14% 24% 22% 11% 15%
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prices, surging unit labour cost and dropping unemployment rates signalled gradual 
overheating of the EU Single Market. Since the crises, flow variables, such as the current 
account deficit or the credit flow have corrected, similarly to price variables (real 
exchange rates, nominal unit labour costs, real house prices), while debt indicators (NIIP, 
private and public debt) and unemployment rate have kept on increasing.  
Table 7. Evolution of headline indicators across years (average in Member States) 
 
Source: Eurostat, 2016, authors calculations 
Figure 4 exhibits the strong autocorrelation of both the total number of red flags by year 
and of the underlying MIP indicators. Annual trendlines are close to the 45°degree line 
for red flags, implying that imbalance signals fade away only in the medium term, 
however, the slope of trendlines flattened as the situation improved. Autocorrelation is a 
phenomenon of stock indicators (debt, unemployment or market share), flow indicators 
and prices are less persistent.  
Figure 4. Autocorrelation of MIP number of red flags and individual indicators 
Number of red flags per Member 
States in year (t) and year (t-1) 
First order autocorrelation of indicator values 
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2005 -2.3 -25.9 5.4 22.8 9.4 8.7 12.7 118.4 46.6 8.7 24.8
2006 -3.1 -30.3 2.9 14.6 8.8 13.3 16.3 124.6 44.9 8.3 18.6
2007 -4.0 -36.4 3.7 17.5 12.2 11.0 24.4 139.9 43.0 7.5 19.7
2008 -4.6 -38.1 6.2 12.1 15.7 -1.7 12.2 148.1 46.1 6.8 11.2
2009 -3.7 -44.3 5.4 6.8 16.4 -9.5 0.1 156.4 55.0 7.3 2.8
2010 -2.4 -43.9 0.0 -0.3 9.8 -2.9 1.7 153.8 60.8 8.5 3.7
2011 -1.1 -41.3 -2.6 -1.5 3.5 -3.1 4.7 153.4 65.1 9.7 3.9
2012 -0.6 -41.6 -4.3 -10.7 1.5 -4.4 2.6 154.1 68.7 10.4 3.0
2013 0.3 -41.0 -0.8 -8.8 3.7 -1.4 0.1 150.1 72.3 10.7 -1.2
2014 1.1 -39.1 -0.7 -5.9 3.9 1.9 0.8 149.5 73.6 10.8 5.8
2015 1.8 -36.2 -1.1 0.0 1.9 3.2 1.9 148.0 71.9 10.4 3.4
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3.6 Weighting and aggregation 
The MIP Scoreboard, similarly to other scoreboards, is designed to give equal importance 
to each of the 11 headline indicators. Most composite indicators also rely on equal 
weighting schemes because this method is easy to understand and to communicate.  
One method to check the suitability of equal weights can be based on the principle 
component analysis. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure for the MIP dataset is 0.67, 
which can be classified as ’mediocre’, not very good for principal component analysis. 
The variables in the MIP dataset are not sufficiently related to each other, their 
correlations are low, and hence it is unlikely that they share common factors.4 Statistical 
weights that were estimated with the principal component analysis vary between 7% and 
11 % for the 11 MIP indicators, which support the acceptance of equal importance.  
Another method to check whether equal weighting is acceptable is to analyse the results 
of previous empirical studies (see Table 1.). There seems to be currently a disagreement 
in the literature on which MIP indicators perform best as early warning indicators. And 
the lack of consensus could be an argument in favour of an equal weighting scheme.  
3.7 Uncertainty analysis of the MIP evaluation 
The MIP aims at identifying the macroeconomic imbalance in Member States, and its 
main output is the MIP categorisation of countries according to their exposure to 
imbalance risks (See Figure 1. Flow chart of the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure).  
To assess the uncertainty of MIP evaluation to methodological choices we randomised  
(a) the indicators [red flags or distance to threshold]  
(b) the aggregation method[arithmetic or geometric mean]  
(c) the weights [Gaussian noise on the weights, ∑𝑤𝑖 = 1.] 
Uncertainty of MIP ranks is relatively low especially at the bottom and top, however for 
middle ranked Member States variability of rankings is relatively high (difference 
between minimum and maximum can be as high as 5-20 ranks). (Figure 5). This result 
implies that the selection of worst and best performers is robust to the methodological choices 
investigated.  
                                           
4 An earlier analysis of the JRC about European Systemic Risk Board’s country heat map also revealed that 
bivariate correlations of risk indicators are very low. 
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Figure 5. MIP Rankings based on different methodological choices (year of observations 
= 2015) 
 
Ranks have not substantially changed for most Member States in terms of MIP 
Scoreboard red flags over time (Table 8). Member State’s absolute ranks changed by 6 
places on average, meaning that countries were likely to jump only to a neighbouring 
quartile or remain in the same between 2005 and 2015. The ranking of Latvia and 
Bulgaria improved the most between 2005 and 2015 (by 17 and 14 places, respectively), 
while the Netherlands and United Kingdom’s position worsened the most (by 17 and 11 
places, respectively). 
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Table 8. MIP rankings based on the number of red flags  
 
3.8 Signals Approach and an MIP composite metric 
We combine the signals approach of empirical studies (Box 2) and the composite 
indicator methodology to provide a new method for evaluating the performance of the 
MIP Scoreboard. Such method has been proposed by the empirical study by Christensen 
and Li (2014) to capture the fragility of the economy prior to a financial stress event 
most efficiently. ESRB (2017) results on the newly established financial crisis database 
also confirm that multivariate methods can improve upon univariate signalling models.   
Crisis events were defined on the basis of the cyclical GDP gap similarly to earlier studies 
(Domonkos, et al. 2017; Szalai-Csortos, 2013) as follows. The real GDP of each country 
has been filtered by the HP-filter. To calculate the GDP gap, the difference between the 
basic time series and trend has been taken. We determined the threshold of the critical 
difference at minus 2 per cent, as proposed by the studies referred in this report. 
We defined a composite measure as the sum of the red flags (or signals) based on official 
thresholds. We set 3 as a starting value for the threshold of the composite measure. 
(Reminder: on average 4 indicators were flagged in member states during the run-up 
and aftermath of the 2008-2009 crisis.) The number of red flags were incorporated in the 
Commission analysis, without being the only or main determinant of the AMR outcomes 
(European Commission, 2016). However, the thresholds for the total number of red flags 
have never been communicated yet by the European Commission. 
According to the Usefulness metrics the nominal unit labour cost performed best as 
forecasting indicator for crisis events (U =0.21). Furthermore, the current account and 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Change in 
ranking (2015-
Czech Republic 1 1 7 6 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 0
Austria 2 2 2 1 1 1 3 2 3 4 4 2
Belgium 2 9 11 13 13 12 18 10 9 6 8 6
Finland 2 4 1 2 13 12 18 10 9 6 8 6
Germany 2 4 2 2 6 1 3 18 9 6 4 2
Netherlands 2 4 4 6 1 1 18 23 21 20 19 17
Slovenia 2 2 7 6 6 1 1 2 9 6 4 2
Italy 8 4 4 2 6 1 3 10 9 6 8 0
Poland 8 19 18 13 6 1 13 2 3 1 2 -6
United Kingdom 8 4 11 13 13 18 13 10 9 24 19 11
Croatia 11 19 25 13 6 18 18 18 21 20 8 -3
Denmark 11 9 7 13 1 1 3 10 9 6 19 8
France 11 9 4 2 1 1 13 18 9 20 8 -3
Romania 11 27 25 6 6 12 3 2 1 1 2 -9
Sweden 11 9 11 13 13 18 3 2 3 6 8 -3
Hungary 16 13 14 13 13 1 13 18 21 6 19 3
Lithuania 16 19 18 6 13 1 3 2 3 6 8 -8
Luxembourg 16 15 7 6 6 12 18 18 1 6 8 -8
Malta 16 19 18 6 13 18 18 10 9 6 8 -8
Portugal 16 13 14 24 20 25 26 24 24 20 19 3
Slovakia 16 15 18 22 20 23 13 10 3 4 4 -12
Bulgaria 22 15 18 24 20 12 3 10 9 6 8 -14
Cyprus 22 19 25 24 20 23 26 28 28 27 28 6
Estonia 22 15 14 22 20 18 3 2 9 6 19 -3
Ireland 25 19 14 28 27 28 28 24 24 28 27 2
Latvia 25 19 18 13 20 12 3 2 9 6 8 -17
Greece 27 19 18 13 20 25 24 24 24 24 26 -1
Spain 28 28 25 24 27 25 24 24 24 24 19 -9
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net international investment position were also a relatively good indicators (U =0.12) 
compared to other MIP indicators, on average performing as weak indicators (average U 
=0.02).  
Importantly, the simple composite of red flags performed second best (U =0.14) in the 
baseline scenario shown in Table 1. (forecast horizon = 4 Y, threshold for the number of 
red flags, >3).Taking into account that decisions can not be based on sole indicators, 
using the second best composite measure could be an option to be considered by 
decision makers.  
Table 9. Summary of the signals approach metrics for individual indicators and 
composite (forecast horizon = 4 Y, threshold for the number of red flags ;> 3)   
 
 
3.9 Linking MIP Categories to the Scoreboard  
There exists only an indirect link between the MIP Scoreboard (first step of the MIP 
procedure) and MIP Categorisation (last step). The scatter plot of the imbalance ranking 
and the number of MIP threshold breaches shows, however, that the association is 
positive as expected, and many program countries could be identified on the bases of 
threshold breaches (Figure 6.).  
We also ran logistic regressions between imbalance rankings and MIP threshold breaches 
to test statistically which of the scoreboard variables have an impact on the final MIP 
categorisation. DG ECFIN estimated similar regressions, however the MIP indicators were 
grouped into one indicator, and the total effect of this grouped indicator have been 
estimated, not individual effects by all MIP Indicators. Also, the MIP procedure has been 
regressed on Country-Specific Recommendations (CSR) progress indicator and also 
synthetic indicator of economic conditions, in flows and in levels, showing the influence of 
the latter. It must be also remarked, that the MIP dataset is ‘backward looking’ and the 
decisions on imbalance takes into account latest information, economic forecasts as well. 
It is a question, however, whether the scoreboard could be updated and published more 
frequently to increase transparency and help decision makers and the public find better 
solutions. The MIP Scoreboard is a key element of country categorization because 
macroeconomic imbalance shows strong positive autocorrelation and statistical facts are 
more certain than forecasts. 
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A -CORRECT SIGNALS (CRISIS OCCURS AS IT IS FORECASTED) 65 62 25 37 58 28 26 44 30 17 29 66
B - wrong signal (NO crisis occurs, but forecasted) 42 40 18 38 17 26 24 39 45 23 22 40
C - wrong signal (crisis occurs but NOT forecasted) 32 35 72 60 39 69 71 53 67 80 68 31
D - CORRECT SIGNAL (CRISIS NOT  OCCURS & NOT FORECASTED) 57 59 81 61 82 73 75 60 54 76 77 59
Correct forecasts (A+D)/(A+B+C+D) 62% 62% 54% 50% 71% 52% 52% 53% 43% 47% 54% 64%
Share of correct crisis signals (A/(A+C) 67% 64% 26% 38% 60% 29% 27% 45% 31% 18% 30% 68%
type I error  (C/(A+C)) 33% 36% 74% 62% 40% 71% 73% 55% 69% 82% 70% 32%
type II error (B/(B+D)) 42% 40% 18% 38% 17% 26% 24% 39% 45% 23% 22% 40%
NSR - Noise to signal ratio (B/(B+D)/A/)A+C) 0.63 0.63 0.71 1.01 0.29 0.91 0.90 0.87 1.47 1.33 0.74 0.59
Usefulness (min[θ;1-θ]-θC/)A+C)-(1-θ)B/(B+D) 0.12 0.12 0.04 0.00 0.21 0.01 0.01 0.03 -0.07 -0.03 0.04 0.14
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Figure 6. Imbalance ranking and the number of MIP threshold breaches (2010-2013 
averages)* 
 
*Yellow lines indicate the median values and dotted yellow lines the 75% percentiles. 
 
The independent variable of the regressions was an ordinary variable of MIP 
Categorisation (1. No imbalances, 2. Imbalances, 3. Excessive imbalances, 4. Program 
countries) and the explanatory variables consisted of either the breach of thresholds (red 
flags) or the absolute distance to threshold (in % of the threshold, if the threshold was 
breached) or the min max normalized variables in our specification.  
To test whether alternative MIP indicator thresholds do exist in line with our hypothesis 
(discussed in Section 2.2.1) at the other side of the indicator distributions, we used 
dummy variables. Such dummies have been created for the net international investment 
position, export market shares, nominal unit labour costs, real house prices, private 
sector credit flow and unemployment taking the value of 1 if the underlying indicator was 
above/below the alternative threshold (1st or 3rd quartile of the indicator on the other side 
of distribution). Similar dummies have not been used for the government sector debt, 
private sector debt and for the total financial sector liabilities, as alternative thresholds, 
because in case of these indicators these alternative thresholds would not have been 
effective for most countries in our post-crisis sample.  
The results show that only few of the MIP indicators have a significant impact on the MIP 
imbalance categorisation at standard confidence levels. Only nominal unit labour costs 
turned out to be significant in all specifications (red flags and distance to threshold, 
respectively), and in some specifications export market shares and government debt. The 
results are, in general, in line with the results of Boysen-Hogrefe et al. (2015) showing 
the significant impact of export market shares, private sector debt and government debt 
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on IDR classification (Table 1). Most of the coefficient signs are in line with the logic of 
the scoreboard, even if the coefficients are not significant. Breaches of thresholds 
increase the probability of worse MIP categorisation for stock variables, unemployment, 
but surprisingly real house prices have a negative effect. This may confirm the 
argumentation that not only too fast but too slow real house price growth could be 
problematic.  
Furthermore, the alternative threshold for the private credit flow had a significant 
negative sign, suggesting the existence of an alternative implicit threshold. In other 
words, the MIP categorisation was worse for those Member States, where credit to 
private sector grew less than the threshold set at the 1st quartile of the sample. This may 
mean that the speed of deleveraging in the financial sector was somehow taken into 
account during the second and third step of the MIP, in the Alert Mechanism Report 
(AMR) and in In-depth Review (IdR), respectively. In particularly, because the monitoring 
and correction was perhaps a more important goal of the MIP in the post-crisis period 
then the early warning goal. However, this evidence confirms our suggestion based on 
theoretical concepts that the one sided official thresholds could be reconsidered in certain 
cases. Especially, because the indicators based on official thresholds turned out to be 
insignificant in many cases.  
After comparing values of scoreboard variables to thresholds, possible interactions could 
be also taken into account during the European Commission’s deliberation in the Alert 
Mechanism Report. To test whether the simultaneous influence of two indicators is not 
additive, interaction terms have been also tested. Some combinations of macroeconomic 
challenges were more frequent than others (European Commission, 2016), which has 
influenced the selection of indicator pairs for interaction tests. The following interactions 
have been tested: current account and general government debt, private debt and 
general government debt, export market share and nominal unit labour cost, real house 
prices and private sector credit flow, total financial sector liabilities and net international 
investment position, though only the current account and general government debt 
interaction term had a significant coefficient. One explanation could be the ‘twin deficit 
theory’5. Twin deficits are common situations, when the general government budget and 
current account worsen in the same time. Although budget deficit is not amongst the MIP 
indicators, it is one of the key drivers of general government debt in the short run.  
Table 10. Results of logistic regressions (dependent variable: MIP Imbalance categories) 
 
3.10 Visualisation and transparency 
The MIP scoreboard has an important communication role (European Commission, 2012). 
This is the reason, why only a limited number of indicators were integrated in the final 
Scoreboard. For transparency reasons, the Commission made the scoreboard indicators 
publicly available on its website. Furthermore, the Commission has taken steps to 
improve the communication of its MIP-relevant analysis. 
                                           
5 Cavalo (2005) argues that higher budget deficit implies in economic theory less national saving, which is the 
sum of private saving plus the government fiscal balance. By definition, when national saving falls below 
domestic investment—that is, when a country lacks sufficient saving to finance its investment, and hence 
borrows from abroad—the current account is in deficit.  
Coef.   z P>z Coef.   z P>z Coef.   z P>z
Lag. dep. Var. L(MIP_class) 3.4 6.04 0.00 3.23 5.77 0.00 3.53 5.66 0.00
Current account balance -.72 -0.49 0.62 0.07 0.02 0.98 5.53 1.24 0.22
Net international investment position -.46 -0.44 0.66 0.38 0.70 0.49 -4.05 -1.12 0.26
Real effective exchange rate -.02 -0.03 0.98 -2.61 -1.82 0.07 -2.57 -0.53 0.60
Export market shares .81 0.77 0.44 0.70 2.15 0.03 -9.62 -2.15 0.03
Nominal unit labour cost 2.49 2.56 0.01 5.22 2.15 0.03 29.94 3.47 0.00
House price index, deflated -2.32 -1.40 0.16 -1.11 -0.66 0.51 -13.18 -1.47 0.14
Private sector credit flow .56 0.32 0.75 0.09 0.04 0.97 4.67 0.91 0.36
Private sector debt .83 0.55 0.58 0.09 0.07 0.94 1.02 0.40 0.69
General government sector debt 1.48 1.23 0.22 1.69 1.66 0.10 6.58 2.37 0.02
Unemployment rate .62 0.79 0.43 0.52 0.41 0.69 2.90 1.14 0.25
Total financial sector liabilities .34 0.19 0.85 0.08 0.02 0.98 0.02 0.00 1.00
DUMMY (NIIP> 3rd quartile) -1.87 -1.84 0.07 -0.95 -1.04 0.30 -1.53 -1.23 0.22
DUMMY (EXPSH> 3rd quartile) .6 0.49 0.62 0.49 0.44 0.66 3.23 1.90 0.06
DUMMY (ULC<1st quartile) -.2 -0.26 0.80 -0.52 -0.60 0.55 1.33 1.29 0.20
DUMMY (RHOUSEPRICE<1st quartile) .82 1.12 0.26 0.87 1.23 0.22 -0.24 -0.24 0.81
DUMMY (PRIVCRDFLOW<1st quartile) -1.79 -2.13 0.03 -2.21 -2.81 0.01 -2.43 -2.53 0.01
DUMMY (UNEMP <1st quartile) -.87 -0.61 0.54 -1.06 -0.72 0.47 -1.36 -0.80 0.43
Interactions DUMMY (GOVDEBT & CA> thresholds) 3.58 1.96 0.05 3.74 1.69 0.09 3.34 2.32 0.02
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The MIP Scoreboard is presented currently as a table, in which threshold breaches are 
highlighted (Annex 2). Both decision makers and the wider public could benefit from 
improved data visualisation solutions. For example, adjustable mapping tools allowing 
the simultaneous modification of all dimensions of the dataset (from indicators to 
countries, time or statistical aggregation methods, etc.) could help to look at the MIP 
dataset from different angles in an efficient and meaningful way and to make better 
policy or private decisions. Similar solutions are introduced in practice in many policy 
fields.  
Figure 7. MIP – number of red flags by country (2015) 
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4 CONCLUSIONS 
This report aimed at developing the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure and its MIP 
Scoreboard in line with its principles, so as to make it an even more reliable monitoring 
tool for decision making and effective communication.  
In this report, we argued in favour of two sided thresholds for MIP indicators. Setting 
thresholds on both sides could be an obvious choice for many flow indicators in the MIP 
Scoreboard to identify imbalances both ex-ante and ex-post (in accordance with the 
prevention and correction goals of the MIP). Two sided (upper and lower) thresholds 
have been already introduced for two MIP indicators: the current account deficit (+6% 
and -4% compared to the Gross Domestic Product) and for the real effective exchange 
rate (-/+5% for euro-area countries and - /+11% for non-euro-area countries). Also, the 
European Commission (2012) derived MIP thresholds for many indicators from the 
observed distribution of indicators and equated the thresholds to lower or upper 
quartiles. The argumentation to introduce both upper and lower thresholds could be 
based on theoretical arguments (see 2.2.2) and on a statistical approach that values in 
both tails of the distribution should be differentiated. For example, in case of house 
prices the +6% current official threshold could be interpreted as an early warning 
(prevention) threshold, while the +10% threshold for unemployment as an ex-post 
(correction) indicator of fading away crisis and imbalances. Setting two sided thresholds 
could be an obvious choice for many other indicators in the MIP Scoreboard to identify 
imbalances both ex-ante and ex-post. For example, a new lower threshold for 
unemployment rates set below the so-called natural rate may help to identify an 
excessive boom period and serve as an early-warning indicator. The average 
unemployment rate in Member States dropped below 7 percent before the financial crisis, 
close to the natural level, which could have been a signal of overheating. Similar second 
thresholds could be considered for real house prices or private sector credit flows.  
We showed in this paper that each step of the OECD-JRC composite indicator 
methodology can deliver important insights and can contribute to the development of the 
MIP Scoreboard. The first two steps have been already taken, because there exists a 
theoretical framework (see the detailed literature review in European Commission, 2012) 
and well structured, high quality official data is available in the Eurostat database. In this 
report, we discuss further steps: treatment of missing data and outliers, multivariate 
analysis, normalisation, weighting and aggregation, uncertainty analysis and 
visualisation.  
Our outlier analysis identified three MIP indicators as potentially problematic: (i) nominal 
unit labour cost, (ii) private sector credit flow and (iii) total financial liabilities. We opted 
for a straightforward and well-known method to treat outliers, called Winzorization.  
The practical usage of the MIP Scoreboard might be impeded by the different 
measurement units and distribution of headline indicators. Therefore, we applied 
standard normalisation methods together with methods based on the guidance provided 
by DG ECFIN of the European Commission about the interpretation of the scoreboard (a) 
min-max normalisation, (b) ranking, (c) red flag analysis, which is a comparison of actual 
values to the official thresholds, and (d) distance to target metrics (Section 33.5). 
The multivariate analysis showed that the MIP Scoreboard indicators are only weakly 
collinear within the external and internal imbalance pillars of the MIP Scoreboard and it is 
unlikely that they share common factors. To investigate, whether the different MIP 
indicators signal problems in the same time the association of the official MIP threshold 
breaches was analysed. The Phi coefficient matrix suggests that the MIP scoreboard 
indicators and thresholds are consistent. Still, the Phi coefficients are very low, although 
significant in most cases. A practical consequence of moderated association is that if the 
scoreboard gave usually vague warning signals, e.g. only few but not necessary all or not 
the majority of indicators gave signals at the same time, then policy makers were more 
likely to become resistant to act.  
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We combine the signals approach of empirical studies (Section 33.8) and the composite 
indicator methodology to provide a new method for evaluating the performance of the 
MIP Scoreboard. Such method has been proposed by the empirical study of Christensen 
and Li (2014) to capture the fragility of the economy prior to a financial stress event 
most efficiently. According to the Usefulness metrics the nominal unit labour cost 
performed best as forecasting indicator for crisis events (U =0.21). Furthermore, the 
current account and net international investment position were also a relatively good 
indicators (U =0.12) compared to other MIP indicators, on average performing as weak 
indicators (average U =0.02). Importantly, the simple composite of red flags performed 
second best (U =0.14) in the baseline scenario. Taking into account that decisions can 
not be based on sole indicators, using the second best composite measure could be an 
option to be considered by decision makers.  
Finally, we ran logistic regressions to test statistically, which of the scoreboard variables 
may have an impact on the MIP Categorisation, e.g. between the first and last steps of 
the MIP procedure. The results show that only few of the MIP indicators have a significant 
impact at standard confidence levels. To test whether alternative MIP indicator thresholds 
do exist for flow variables in line with our hypothesis (discussed in section 2.2.2) at the 
other side of the indicator distributions, we used dummy variables. The results confirm 
that the alternative threshold for the private credit flow could have already existed as an 
alternative implicit threshold. To test whether the simultaneous influence of two 
indicators is not additive, interaction terms have been also used, though only the current 
account and general government debt interaction term had a significant coefficient, 
confirming that the risks of “twin-deficit” situations could have been taken into account 
by the European Commission during the AMR and IdR phases of the MIP procedure. 
The MIP Scoreboard is presented currently as a table, in which threshold breaches are 
highlighted. Both the decision makers and the wider public could probably benefit from 
increased transparency and improved data visualisation solutions.  
Future research could consider how the definition of the crisis event effects on the results 
of the signals approach. Also, cluster analysis could help to identify groups of countries, 
and, inside these groups of countries, to see how the indicators can be combined. 
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ANNEXES 
 
Annex 1. Descriptive statistics of the MIP Scoreboard Indicators 
 
Source: Eurostat, 2016, authors calculations 
Annex 2. The MIP Scoreboard 2015 
 
Source: AMR 2017 
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Kurtosis 0.02 -0.31 4.17 1.75 10.79 4.92 100.54 1.19 0.84 3.80 13.68
Skewness -0.33 -0.11 1.33 1.46 2.35 0.89 7.71 1.14 0.82 1.71 2.55
Minimum -21.00 -208.00 -20.40 -30.80 -21.00 -37.10 -35.20 39.10 3.70 3.70 -17.20
Maximum 11.00 65.20 35.90 95.60 78.50 46.00 223.60 402.30 179.70 26.30 115.70
No of observations 308 308 308 308 308 305 308 308 308 308 308
1st quartile -5.20 -73.38 -2.50 -12.33 2.80 -4.00 0.28 97.05 37.28 6.40 0.70
3rd quartile 2.25 -4.45 3.50 13.03 10.30 4.70 12.33 185.13 80.20 10.50 13.08
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35 
GETTING IN TOUCH WITH THE EU 
In person 
All over the European Union there are hundreds of Europe Direct information centres. You can find the 
address of the centre nearest you at: http://europea.eu/contact 
On the phone or by email 
Europe Direct is a service that answers your questions about the European Union. You can contact this 
service: 
- by freephone: 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (certain operators may charge for these calls), 
- at the following standard number: +32 22999696, or 
- by electronic mail via: http://europa.eu/contact 
FINDING INFORMATION ABOUT THE EU 
Online 
Information about the European Union in all the official languages of the EU is available on the Europa 
website at: http://europa.eu 
EU publications 
You can download or order free and priced EU publications from EU Bookshop at: 
http://bookshop.europa.eu. Multiple copies of free publications may be obtained by contacting Europe 
Direct or your local information centre (see http://europa.eu/contact). 
36 
 doi:10.2760/038148 
ISBN 978-92-79-98453-2 
K
J-N
A
-2
9
5
8
8
-E
N
-N
 
